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Abstract—Adversarial examples are known to mislead deep
learning models to incorrectly classify them, even in domains
where such models achieve state-of-the-art performance.
Until recently, research on both attack and defense methods
focused on image recognition, primarily using convolutional
neural networks (CNNs). In recent years, adversarial example
generation methods for recurrent neural networks (RNNs) have
been published, demonstrating that RNN classifiers are also
vulnerable to such attacks.
In this paper, we present a novel defense method, termed
sequence squeezing, to make RNN classifiers more robust against
such attacks. Our method differs from previous defense methods
which were designed only for non-sequence based models. We
also implement four additional RNN defense methods inspired
by recently published CNN defense methods.
We evaluate our methods against state-of-the-art attacks in the
cyber security domain where real adversaries (malware develop-
ers) exist, but our methods can be applied against other discrete
sequence based adversarial attacks, e.g., in the NLP domain.
Using our methods we were able to decrease the effectiveness of
such attack from 99.9% to 15%.
I. INTRODUCTION
The growing use of deep learning in fields like computer
vision and natural language processing (NLP) [31], has been
accompanied by increased interest in the domain of adversarial
learning, that is, attacking and defending deep learning models
algorithmically. Of special interest are adversarial examples,
which are samples slightly modified in order to be misclassi-
fied by the attacked classifier.
Most of the research in deep adversarial learning has
focused mainly on convolutional neural networks (CNNs)
commonly used in the computer vision domain, and more
specially, in the image recognition domain [5]. However, in
recent years, more and more adversarial example generation
methods have been presented in the NLP domain in order
to bypass recurrent neural network (RNN) classifiers, e.g.,
sentiment analysis classifiers [19].
Adversarial attacks have also been used in the cyber security
domain. This domain raises special interest, because it involves
adversaries: malware developers who want to evade next
generation machine and deep learning based classifiers. Such
attacks have already been executed against static analysis non
sequential deep neural networks [2].
The threat of such attacks makes adversarial attacks against
RNN classifiers an interesting and important real-life use case,
especially in the cyber security domain. For this reason, we
focus this paper on RNN defense methods in the cyber security
domain and not, for instance, on the more heavily researched
NLP domain. Thus, we only focus on discrete sequence
input (e.g., discrete API call type sequences). Evaluating the
methods presented in this paper in other domains where the
input is a sequence, such as NLP, will be a part of our future
work.
The most prominent use case of RNN classifiers in the cyber
security domain is analyzing API calls of a running process as
features [4], [26], [29], [38]. API call based RNN classifiers
have superior performance in comparison to their CNN equiv-
alents [9], [41]. This results from the RNN classifiers’ ability
to leverage the context of the malicious API calls, using their
hidden state as context memory. In contrast, CNN classifiers
can only use adjacent API calls as a context, due to their spatial
locality, which is less relevant when analyzing long API call
traces.
Attacks against API call based RNN classifiers have already
been published [40], [41]. Thus, in-order to use such classifiers
in an adversarial setting, we need adversarial defense methods
that works with API call based RNN classifiers, which is the
focus of this paper.
One might claim that a defense method that does not block
100% of the adversarial examples is insufficient in certain
domains, such as the cyber security domain. We consider
two cases. The first is an attacker that wants to infect a
target with a specific, perhaps specially crafted, malware (e.g.,
the WannaCry ransomware, Cosmic Duke APT, etc.). If this
adversarial example cannot evade the malware classifier, the
attacker must invest a lot of time generating another malware
to use against the target host(s). Thus, defense methods that
block 85% of the attacks, as presented in this paper, have a
significant value. In the second case, the attacker holds an
arsenal of malware, and he/she would like to have any of then
successfully bypassing our detection mechanism. In this case,
100% detection rate is needed. However, we consider this use
case to be less realistic.
The contributions of our paper are as follows:
1) We present sequence squeezing, a novel defense method
that reduces the adversarial space and limits the possibility
of generating adversarial input sequences. This reduction is
performed without modifying the classifier. The reduction uses
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a dedicated sequence transformation, since image based input
transformations (such as reducing the image depth) cannot be
applied to sequence inputs.
2) We present four additional defense methods, inspired by
CNN defenses:
(i) A method that uses adversarial examples’ statistical
properties, leveraging the correlation between items inside the
sequence. This has not been done in previous research which
uses non-sequence inputs.
(ii) A method that uses several different subsequences inside
the input sequence as training sets for several models used in
an ensemble.This prevents adversarial examples with localized
modifications from fooling the entire ensemble. This method
cannot be used on non-sequence input.
(iii) A method that trains a generative adversarial network
(GAN) on the training set and uses the output that is closest
to the original input instead of the input sequence itself. This
is done in order to remove the adversarial perturbations before
classification. GANs used for image generation cannot be
used here, because the discrete outputs from the generative
model (e.g., API call type sequences) make it difficult to
pass the gradient update from the discriminative model to the
generative model.
(iv) A method that classifies the input sequence’s nearest
neighbor in the training set instead of the input sequence itself.
This is done in order to remove the adversarial perturbations
before classification.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no paper addressing
and evaluating defense methods against RNN adversarial at-
tacks at all, and particularly not in the cyber security domain,
in which adversaries actually exist- malware writers, who want
their malware to evade the detection of next generation, ma-
chine learning based malware classifiers. Our methods reduces
the number of adversarial examples evading the classifier by
more than 85%.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. RNN Adversarial Examples
The search for adversarial examples is formalized as a
minimization problem [45], [10]:
argrmin f(x+ r) 6= f(x) s.t. x+ r ∈D (1)
The input x, correctly classified by the classifier f , is per-
turbed with r such that the resulting adversarial example x+r
remains in the input domain D but is assigned a different
label than x. To solve Equation 1, we need to transform the
constraint f(x+ r) 6= f(x) into an optimizable formulation.
Then we can easily use the Lagrange multiplier to solve it.
To do this, we define a loss function Loss() to quantify this
constraint. This loss function can be the same as the training
loss, or it can be chosen differently, e.g., hinge loss or cross-
entropy loss.
Most sequence based adversarial attacks take place in the
NLP domain. Papernot et al. [37] presented a white-box ad-
versarial example attack against RNNs, demonstrated against
LSTM architecture, for sentiment classification of a movie
review dataset, where the input is the review, and the output
is whether the review was positive or negative. The adversary
iterates over the words x[i] in the review and modifies it as
follows:
x[i] = argmin
z
||sign(x[i]−z)− sign(Jf (x)[i, f(x)])|| (2)
s.t. z ∈D
where f(x) is the original model label for x, and
Jf (x)[i, j] =
∂fj
∂xi
(x). sign(Jf (x)[i, f(x)]) provides the
direction one has to perturb each of the word embedding
components in order to reduce the probability assigned to
the current class and thus change the class assigned to the
sentence. The idea is that changing one (or a few) word can
change the meaning of the sentence. For instance, changing:
“This is the best movie have I ever seen” to: “This is the
worst movie I have ever seen.” This approach of modifying
a word by the gradient is commonly used in many attacks
in order to achieve maximum classification impact with a
minimal amount of changes. Gao et al. [19] attacked sentiment
classification models in a black-box setting by either inserting,
deleting, or swapping characters to generate misspelled words
mapped into the ’unknown’ word in the NLP dictionary, using
various scoring functions to find the most important words to
modify. Other than attacking text classifiers, Jian and Liang
[28] aimed to fool reading comprehension systems by adding
misleading sentences. Zhao et al. [52] used a generative ad-
versarial network (GAN) to craft natural adversarial examples.
Seq2seq models are attacked in [17], [14], which use a word-
level attack method (the latter focuses on adding specific
“malicious” keywords to the adversarial sentence). Alzantot et
al. [6] presented an attack algorithm that exploits population
based gradient-free optimization via genetic algorithms.
Attacks in the cyber security domain, mainly for malware
classifiers based on API calls, have also been presented. Hu
and Tan [25] presented a generative RNN based approach, in
which invalid APIs are generated and inserted into the original
API sequences. Recently, Rosenberg et al. [41] presented a
black-box variant of the attack in [37], by creating a substitute
model and attacking it using a similar method, and extended
it to hybrid classifiers combining static and dynamic features
and architectures. Rosenberg et al. [40] further presented
both black-box and white-box query-efficient attacks based
on perturbations generated using a GAN that was trained on
benign samples.
B. Defense Mechanisms Against Non-Sequence Based Adver-
sarial Attacks
Several methods have been suggested to detect whether a
sample is an adversarial example.
Some papers focused on statistical properties of adversarial
examples. Grosse et al.[20] leveraged the fact that adversarial
samples usually have a different distribution than normal
samples. The statistical differences between them can be
detected using a high-dimensional statistical test of maximum
mean discrepancy or by adding another class of adversarial
examples to the classifier. In contrast to our work, their re-
search deals with non-sequential input only. Metzen et al. [23]
took a similar approach and augment deep neural networks
with a small “detector” subnetwork which is trained on the
binary classification task of distinguishing genuine data from
data containing adversarial perturbations. Feinman et al. [18]
detected adversarial examples using two new features: kernel
density estimates in the subspace of the last hidden layer of
the original classifier and Bayesian neural network uncertainty
estimates. Meng et al. [35] used a reformer network (which
is an auto-encoder or a collection of auto-encoders) is trained
to differentiate between normal and adversarial examples by
approximating the manifold of normal examples. When using
a collection of autoencoders, one reformer network is chosen
at random at test time, thus strengthening the defense.
In [12], it was shown that most techniques like these
cannot handle a well-designed adversarial attack in the image
recognition domain.
Xu et al. [49] used a different approach, feature squeezing,
to detect adversarial examples. This is done by reducing the
search space available to an adversary by coalescing samples
that correspond to many different feature vectors in the original
space into a single sample; this is accomplished by applying
various image-specific dimensionality reduction transforma-
tions to the input features. If the original and squeezed inputs
produce substantially different outputs from the model, the
input is likely to be adversarial. This method applied the
following image-specific dimensionality reduction transfor-
mations to the input features: 1) Changing the image color
depth (e.g., from 24 bit to 8 bit). 2) Spatial smoothing (blur).
However, applying those transformations to discrete sequence
input (e.g., API call trace input for malware classification or
words for sentiment analysis) is not possible, because those
transformation only fit images.
Instead of actively trying to detect adversarial examples,
another approach is to passively try to make the classifier
more robust against such attacks. Such methods avoid the false
positives that might occur in the abovementioned techniques.
Using an ensemble of DNNs as a classifier resistant to
adversarial attacks on images was shown in [44]. In contrast
to our work, this study only deals with feedforward networks
(mostly CNNs) in the computer vision domain. Stokes et al.
[43] evaluate three defense methods: weight decay, ensemble
of classifiers, and distillation for a dynamic analysis malware
classifier based on a non-sequence based deep neural network.
Some papers have also used GAN based approaches. Lee
et al. [32] alternately trained both classifier and generator
networks. The generator network generates an adversarial
perturbation that can easily fool the classifier network by
using a gradient of each image. Simultaneously, the classifier
network is trained to classify correctly both original and ad-
versarial images generated by the generator. These procedures
help the classifier network become more robust to adversarial
TABLE I
DEFENSE METHOD OVERVIEW
Defense Method Attack-Specific/
Attack-Agnostic
Novelty
Sequence Squeezing Attack-Agnostic Novel
Defense
Sequence-GAN
Attack-Agnostic Inspired
Nearest Neighbor Attack-Agnostic Inspired
RNN Ensemble Attack-Agnostic Inspired
Adversarial Signatures Attack-Specific Inspired
Adversarial Training Attack-Specific Known
perturbations. Samangouei et al.[42] trained a GAN to model
the distribution of unperturbed images. At inference time, the
closest output (which does not contain the adversarial changes)
to the input image is found. The generated image is then fed to
the classifier, and its prediction is used as the prediction of the
original input. In contrast to our work, this paper only deals
with feedforward networks (mostly CNNs) in the computer
vision domain.
Adversarial training was suggested in [45], which demon-
strated the injection of correctly labeled adversarial samples
in the training set as a means of making the model robust.
Tramer et al. [47] introduced ensemble adversarial training,
a technique that augments training data with perturbations
transferred from other models.
To the best of our knowledge, there is currently no published
and evaluated method to make a sequence based RNN model
resistant to adversarial sequences, beyond a brief mention of
adversarial training as a defense method [6], [33].
Adversarial training has several limitations:
1) It provides a varying level of robustness, depending on
the adversarial examples used.
2) It requires a dataset of adversarial examples to train
on. Thus, it has limited generalization against novel
adversarial attacks.
3) It requires retraining the model if the training set is large,
potentially incurring significant overhead.
Our paper is the first to present and evaluate defense methods
for RNN classifiers, presenting five new defense methods and
comparing them to adversarial training.
III. METHODOLOGY
In this paper we investigate six defense methods which are
described in the subsections that follow. An overview of the
different defense methods appear in Table I.
The evaluated defense methods are divided into three sub-
groups: Novel RNN defense methods, known and previously
evaluated RNN defense methods and RNN defense methods
inspired by existing CNN defense methods. We implemented
the latter subgroup ourselves as a baseline for our novel
attack. Each defense method is either attack-specific, meaning
it requires adversarial examples generated by the attack to
mitigate, or attack-agnostic, that is, it works against all types
of attack methods, without the need to have a dataset of
adversarial examples generated by those attacks, making the
latter a more preferable choice.
Some of the suggested methods affect the classifier (such
as the RNN ensemble method), while others affect only the
sequential input (e.g., the nearest neighbor method).
One might claim that some of the defense methods pre-
sented in this paper are irrelevant, because there are inspired
by CNN defense methods that have been proven to be inef-
fective in cases where the attacker is aware of the defense
method being used and can devise a specialized attack against
this method. We call these attacks adaptive attacks. Such
attacks have been published in [12] (against the detection of
adversarial examples using statistical irregularities), in [22]
(against feature squeezing) and in [8], [21], [27] (against
Defense-GAN). However, implementing adaptive attacks in
the cyber security domain is more challenging than in the
image recognition domain, due to the following differences:
1) They are evaluated against variable length sequential
discrete input and against RNN classifiers, as opposed
to continuous non sequential fixed size input.
2) Modifying features in the cyber domain is only possible
if the malicious functionality remains intact following
this modification.
3) An image used as input to an image classifier (usually a
convolutional neural network, CNN) is represented as a
fixed size matrix of pixel colors. If the actual image has
different dimensions than the input matrix, the picture
will usually be resized, clipped, or padded to fit the
dimension limits. None of those transformation can be
done to a PE file while keeping its functionality intact.
Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, no CNN defense
method published so far is immune to breaking. Even if a
defense method effectiveness can be reduced by an adaptive
attacker - it is still better than no defense at all, since it defend
against the simpler attacks and require more effort from the
attacker in order to implement an adaptive attack.
We didn’t evaluate defense methods with inappropriate
performance (e.g., verifiable training, with 5% test error for
MNIST [48]) and those which makes no sense or require
significant modifications to fit discrete sequential input based
RNN classifiers (e.g., randomized smoothing, which is certi-
fiably robust under the L2 norm [15], which makes less sense
for sequential input).
A. Threat Model
We assume an adversary with full access to a trained
target model, with unlimited number of possible queries, so
query efficient attack (e.g., [40]) is not an issue. However,
the adversary has no ability to influence that model. The
adversary tries to perturb malware to be misclassified by the
model using either black-box or white-box attack techniques,
as specified in Section IV-B. The other sort of adversarial
attack (a benign sample being perturbed to be misclassified
as malicious) makes no sense in real-life, and this case is
thus being ignored in this paper. We also evaluate the cases
where the adversary is aware of the defense methods being
used (adaptive white-box attacks in Section IV-B).
In this paper, we evaluate our defense methods against
API call based RNN malware classifiers, which, as previously
mentioned, is a common and concrete use case in the cyber
security domain. However, all the defense methods mentioned
below are domain agnostic and can be used in any domain
with discrete sequence input. Evaluating those defense in other
domains would be part of our future work.
B. Evaluated Defense Methods
1) Sequence Squeezing: Sequence squeezing is coalescing
samples that correspond to many different feature vectors
in the original space into a single vector that preserves the
original meaning. If the original and squeezed inputs produce
substantially different outputs from the model, the input is
likely to be adversarial, and the features removed by the
squeezing might be the added adversarial perturbation. The
squeezed input is classified using the original classifier without
retraining it, while reducing the search space available to an
adversary by merging semantic similar features into a single
representative feature.
For instance, a malware trying to communicate with
a command and control (CNC) server would prefer to
use HttpSendRequestA(). However, this API is commonly
used by malware and would be detected by malware clas-
sifiers. Thus, an adversarial example would instead use
HttpSendRequestW(), not as commonly used by malware,
in order to evade detection. Using sequence squeezing,
both HttpSendRequestA() and HttpSendRequestW(), which
have similar semantic meaning (here: functionality), would
be squeezed into a single feature group represented by
HttpSendRequestA(), which better represents the group’s se-
mantic meaning due to its common use. The classifier would
see the HttpSendRequestA() in the input sequence instead
of HttpSendRequestW(), and this evasion attack would be
blocked.
Xu et al. used feature squeezing [49] to detect adversarial
examples for images. The essence of their method is the
application of the following image-specific dimensionality
reduction transformations to the input features: 1) Changing
the image color depth (e.g., from 24 bit to 8 bit). 2) Spatial
smoothing (blur). However, applying those transformations to
discrete sequence input (e.g., API call trace input for malware
classification or words for sentiment analysis) makes no sense,
because those transformation only fit images.
We therefore implement a different method that preserves
the semantic meaning of input sequences, while being generic
enough to be applied in diverse domains. While this paper
focus on the cyber security domain, our implementation fits
other sequence based domains, including those with larger
vocabularies and more sophisticated adversarial attacks, in-
cluding semantic transformations, reordering, etc., such as
NLP. The experimental evaluation in the NLP domain would
be part of our future work
Fig. 1. Overview of the Sequence Squeezing Method
Our method is illustrated in Figure 1 and consists of the
following stages:
1) Calculate word embedding, representing each API
call/word in the vocabulary in a semantic-preserving
fashion, that is, words with similar meaning have closer
word embeddings.
2) Merge the words closest (=most similar) to a single
center of mass in order to reduce the dimensionality of
the vocabulary, as well as the adversarial space.
3) Replace all of the words that are part of the merged
group with the word closest to the center of mass of this
group, maintaining lower dimensionality and keeping the
word embeddings used by the original classifier. Thus,
we can classify the squeezed input using the original
classifier without retraining it.
4) Apply the transformation (steps 1..3) on the classifier’s
input sequence. If the classifier’s confidence score for
the squeezed sequence is substantially different from
the confidence score of the original input (the threshold
appears in Equation 3), the sample is adversarial.
The input sequence transformation is shown in Algorithm 1.
We used GloVe [39] word embedding, which, in contrast
to other methods (e.g., word2vec), has been shown to work
effectively with API call traces [24], in order to generate
embed, the word embedding matrix (of size:|D| × d, where
d is the embedding dimensionality) for each API call/word
(line 2). This word embedding is robust enough for domains
with larger vocabularies, to make our attack applicable to other
domains such as NLP .
We then perform agglomerative (bottom-up) hierarchical
clustering on the word embeddings, merging the closest word
embedding (using Euclidean distance, as in [6] - line 7, as
no significant improvement was observed when using cosine
distance. For word embedding, by definition, small Euclidean
indeed distance implies close semantic meaning). Each time
we merge two embeddings, we replace them with their center
of mass, which becomes the embedding of the merged group
to which each of the merged embedding is mapped (lines
10-17). This use of the center of mass preserves the overall
semantic of the group and allows us to keep merging the most
semantically similar words into groups (even to groups which
were previously merged).
After the merging has been completed, we replace each
merged group’s center of mass embedding with the closest
(based on the Euclidean distance) original word merged into
it, so we can use the original classifier trained on the original
embeddings (line 16). The rationale for this is that we want to
choose the API or word with the closest semantic meaning
to the merged group members (represented by the merged
group’s center of mass embedding), in order to maintain the
performance of the original classifier.
To detect adversarial examples, we run the original classifier
twice: once for the original input and a second time for the
sequence squeezed input. If the difference of the confidence
scores of the results is larger than Thresholdadv , we say that
the original input is adversarial. We chose Thresholdadv to
be the maximum difference between the original input and the
squeezed input of all of the samples in the training set. Thus,
this is the minimal threshold that would not affect the training
set classification (and thus the original classifier training).
Additional details are available in Section IV-C1.
Thresholdadv = max(|f(x)− f(xsqueezed)|) (3)
s.t. x ∈ Xtrain,
xsqueezed = Algorithm1(D,Xtrain, sizeDsqueezed)[x]
The defense method training overhead is low and only
involves iterating the training set to calculate the squeezing
transformation. No classifier retraining with the squeezed
vectors takes place. The original classifier is still being used.
The inference overhead is also low: classifying each sample
twice (once with the original input sequence and a second time
with the squeezed sequence) using the original classifier.
1 Input: D (vocabulary), Xtrain (training set of sequences of tokens from D), sizeDsqueezed (size of squeezed vocabulary)
2 embed = GloV e(D,Xtrain) # embed ∈ R|D|×d
3 newEmbed = embed
4 for each word embedding wi in embed:
5 embedMergeHashTable[wi] = {wi}
6 while (width(newEmbed) > sizeDsqueezed):
7 for the two Euclidean closest word embeddings in newEmbed, wi,wj :
8 wmerged =
wi∗|embedMergeHashTable[wi]|+wj∗|embedMergeHashTable[wj ]|
|embedMergeHashTable[wi]|+|embedMergeHashTable[wj ]|
9 # Calculate center of mass for the merged embedding
10 mergedGroup = embedMergeHashTable[wi] ∪ embedMergeHashTable[wj ]
11 # The merged count is the aggregated count
12 remove wi,wj from newEmbed
13 delete embedMergeHashTable[wi]
14 delete embedMergeHashTable[wj ]
15 # Insert the merged embedding wmerged instead of wi,wj
16 insert wmerged to newEmbed
17 embedMergeHashTable[wmerged] = mergedGroup
18 # width(newEmbed) was decremented by 1
19 for each word embedding wnew in newEmbed:
20 if |embedMergeHashTable[wnew]| > 1
21 # Meaning: wnew is a merged word embedding
22 replace wnew with the Euclidean closest word embedding in embedMergeHashTable[wnew]
23 return newEmbed
Algorithm 1: Sequence Squeezing for API Calls and Words
2) Defense Sequence-GAN: One way to filter out the pertur-
bations added by adversarial attack is to train a GAN to model
the distribution of unperturbed input. At inference time, the
GAN output (which does not contain the out-of-distribution
perturbation) that is closest to the target classifier’s input is
found. This input is then fed to the classifier instead, and its
prediction is used as the prediction of the original input.
Samangouei et al. [42] presented Defense-GAN, in which a
GAN was trained to model the distribution of unperturbed
images. However, Defense-GAN is defined for real-valued
data only, while API calls of a malware classifier are discrete
symbols. Small perturbations required by such GANs are not
applicable to discrete API calls.
For instance, you can’t change WriteFile() to Write-
File()+0.001 in order to estimate the gradient needed to perturb
the adversarial example in the right direction; you need to
modify it such that it is an entirely different API.
The discrete outputs from the generative model make it
difficult to pass the gradient update from the discriminative
model to the generative model. We therefore used sequence
GANs, i.e., GAN architectures designed to produce sequences,
in order to adapt this method for input sequences.
Several sequence GAN types were evaluated. For each
sequence GAN type, we trained a sequence GAN per class.
In this study, this means that a “benign sequence GAN” is
used to produce API call sequences drawn from the benign
distribution used to train the GAN (the GAN is trained
using benign samples from the dataset; see Section IV-C2). A
“malicious sequence GAN” is used to produce malicious API
call sequences (the GAN is trained using malicious samples
from the dataset; see Section IV-C2).
For any input sequence to be classified, m benign API
call sequences are generated by the “benign GAN,” and m
malicious API call sequences are generated by the “malicious
GAN.” We calculate the Euclidean distance (no significant
improvement was observed when using the cosine distance)
between the input and each of the 2m generated sequences,
choosing the sequence nearest to the original input sequence.
We then return the classifier’s prediction for the nearest
sequence to the input sequence. The defense sequence GAN
method is illustrated in Figure 2.
We have evaluated the following sequence GAN types:
a) SeqGAN: In SeqGAN [50] implementation, a discrim-
inative model is trained to minimize the binary classification
loss between real benign API call sequences and generated
ones. In addition to the pretraining procedure that uses the
MLE (maximum likelihood estimation) metric, the generator is
modeled as a stochastic policy in reinforcement learning (RL),
bypassing the generator differentiation problem by directly
performing a gradient policy update. Given the API sequence
st = [x0, x1, ..xt−1] and the next API to be sampled from the
model xt ∼ (x|st), the RL algorithm, REINFORCE, optimizes
the GAN objective:
min
φ
− E
Y∼pdata
[logDφ(Y )]− E
Y∼GΘ
[log(1−Dφ(Y ))] (4)
The RL reward signal comes from the GAN discriminator,
judged on a complete sequence, and is passed back to the
Fig. 2. Overview of the defense sequence GAN Method
intermediate state-action steps using Monte Carlo search, in
order to compute the Q-value for generating each token. This
approach is usedfor variance reduction.
b) TextGAN: Zhang et al. [51] proposed a method that
optimizes the maximum mean discrepancy (MMD) loss, which
is the reconstructed feature distance, by adding a reconstruc-
tion term in the objective.
c) GSGAN: The Gumbel-Softmax trick is a
reparametrization trick used to replace the multinomial
stochastic sampling in text generation [30]. GSGAN uses
argmax[softmax(h + g)] v softmax(h), where g is a
Gumbel distribution with zero mean and unit variance. Since
this process is differentiable, backpropagation can be directly
applied to optimize the GAN objective.
d) MaliGAN: The basic structure of MaliGAN [13]
follows that of SeqGAN. To stabilize the training and alleviate
the gradient saturating problem, MaliGAN rescales the reward
in a batch.
In this case, the defense method training overhead is high:
training two GANs with stable performance is challenging, as
discussed in [7].
The inference overhead is also high: generating 2m se-
quences using the two GANs and finding the minimal distance
from the input sequence. This defense method’s overhead
may not be practical for cyber security applications, where
adversaries need to be identified in real time.
3) Nearest Neighbor: In this method, instead of returning
the classifier score for the input sequence, we return the score
of the training set’s sample nearest to it, using the Euclidean
distance (again, no significant improvement was observed
using the cosine distance).
This method leverages the fact that adversarial examples
try to add minimal perturbation to the input sample (Equation
1), so most parts of the input sequence remain identical to
the source (in this case, malicious) class, and the distance
from it would be minimal, thus classifying the input sequence
correctly despite the adversarial perturbation (a discussion on
the importance of minimal perturbation in the cyber domain
appears in Section IV-B).
Note that this method is similar to the defense sequence-
GAN method (presented in Section III-B2), however, instead
of using the GAN output closest to the input sequence, we use
the training set sample closest to the input sequence.
This defense method has no training overhead (the classifier
training does not change).
However, the inference overhead is high: finding the mini-
mal distance of the input sequence from all of the training set
vectors. This is especially true for large training sets, as used
by most real world commercial models.
This overhead can be reduced, e.g., by clustering all of the
training set vectors, and then calculating the distance to each
sample in the closest clusters. However, the overhead problem
still exist for large training sets. Another approach is using the
input sequence distance only from the centroids. However, this
would negatively affect the method’s detection rate due to the
lower granularity.
4) RNN Ensemble: An ensemble of models represents a de-
tour from the basic premise of deep neural networks (including
recurrent neural networks): training a single classifier on all
of the data to obtain the best performance, while overfitting is
handled using different mechanisms, such as dropout.
However, an ensemble of models can be used to mitigate
adversarial examples. An adversarial example is crafted to
bypass a classifier looking at all of the input. Thus, an
ensemble of models, each focusing on a subset of the input
features, is more robust, since the models trained on the input
subsets would not be affected by perturbations performed on
other input subsets. Since adversarial examples are usually
constructed with a minimum amount of localized perturbations
in the input sequence (Equation 1; see discussion in Section
IV-B), they would affect only a small number of models, but
would be detected by, e.g., ensemble majority voting.
The use of an ensemble of models as a defense method
against adversarial examples for images was suggested in [44].
However, the authors only presented the first two types of
models mentioned in our paper (regular and bagging) and only
a single decision method (hard voting), while we leverage
ensemble models that provide better accuracy for sequence
based models, e.g., subsequence models.
We evaluate four types of ensemble models:
1) Regular models - Each model is trained on the entire
training set and all of the input sequences. The difference
between the models in the ensemble is due to the
training method: each model would have different initial
(random) weights and the training optimizer that can
converge to a different function in each model, due to the
optimizer’s “stochasticness” (e.g., a stochastic gradient
descent optimizer picking different sample mini-batches
and therefore converges to a different loss function’s
local minimum of the neural network). This means that
each neural network learns a slightly different model.
2) Bagging models - Bagging [11] is used on the training
set. In those models, the training set consists of drawing
|Xtrain| samples with replacement from the training
dataset of |Xtrain| samples. On average, each model
is trained on 63.02% of the training set, where many
samples appear more than once (are oversampled) in
the new training set.
This means that each model is trained on a random
subset of the training set samples. Thus, each model
learns a slightly different data distribution, (hopefully)
making it more robust to adversarial examples generated
to fit the data distribution of the entire dataset.
While our models were trained using dropout (see
Appendix B), bagging and dropout are not equivalent:
Dropout does not filter entire samples of the training
set (only specific neurons from the neural network)
or oversample them, as bagging does. Dropout is also
applied randomly per epoch and per sample, while a
bagging model’s training set is deterministic.
3) Adversarial models - We start from regular models
ensemble mentioned above. For each model in the
ensemble, adversarial examples are generated and the
model is replaced with a model trained on the original
model training set and the generated adversarial exam-
ples. Thus, these are actually regular models trained
using adversarial training (see Section III-B6).
4) Subsequence models - Since the classifier’s input is
sequential, we can train each model on a subset of the
input sequence, starting from a different offset. That is,
if our model is being trained over sequences of 200 API
calls, we can split the model into 10 submodels: one on
API calls 1..100, the second on API calls 11..110, and
the tenth on API calls 101..200.
Note that the starting offsets can also be randomized per
submodel, instead of fixed as was done in our research.
The idea is that the models which classify an API trace
of an adversarial example in a subsequence without
a perturbed part (i.e., a purely malicious trace) would
be classified correctly, while the perturbed parts would
be divided and analyzed separately, making it easier to
detect that the trace is not benign.
Additional details are available in Section IV-C4.
The output of the ensemble was calculated using one of two
possible methods:
1) Hard voting - Every model predicts its own classifica-
tion, and the final classification is selected by majority
voting between the models in the ensemble.
2) Soft voting - Every model calculates its own confidence
score. The average confidence score of all of the models
in the ensemble is used to determine the classification.
Soft voting gives “confident” models in the ensemble
more power than hard voting.
This defense method does not require knowledge about the
adversarial examples during its setup in order to mitigate them,
making it attack-agnostic, with the exception of adversarial
models, which are attack-specific, based on the definition
provided earlier in Section III.
This defense method training overhead is high: training the
number of models in the ensemble instead of a single model.
The inference overhead is also high: running an inference
for each model in the ensemble instead of once.
5) Adversarial Signatures (a.k.a. Statistical Sequence Ir-
regularity Detection): Adversarial examples are frequently
out-of-distribution samples. Since the target classifier was
not trained on samples from this distribution, generalization
to adversarial examples is difficult. However, this different
distribution can also be used to differentiate between ad-
versarial and non-adversarial samples. Our method searches
for subsequences of API calls that exist only (or mainly) in
adversarial examples, and not in regular samples, in order to
detect if the sample is adversarial. We call those subsequences
adversarial signatures.
Grosse et al. [20] leverage the fact that adversarial samples
have a different distribution than normal samples for non-
sequential input. The statistical differences between them
can be detected using a high-dimensional statistical test of
maximum mean discrepancy. In contrast, our method handles
sequential input and leverages the conditional probabilities
between the sequence elements (API calls or words) instead
of the maximum mean discrepancy.
In order to do that, we start from the observation that in
an API call trace, as well as in natural language sentences,
there is a strong dependence between the sequence elements.
The reason for this is that an API call (or a word in NLP)
is rarely independent, and in order to produce usable business
logic, a sequence of API calls (each relying on the previous
API calls’ output and functionality) must be implemented. For
instance, the API call closesocket() would appear only after the
API call socket(). The same is true for sentences: an adverb
would follow a verb, etc.
For most state-of-the-art adversarial examples, only a small
fraction of API calls is added to the original malicious trace
(see discussion about minimal perturbation in the cyber secu-
rity domain in Section IV-B), and the malicious context (the
original surrounding API calls of the original business logic)
remains. Thus, we evaluated the probability of a certain API
call subsequences to appear, generating “signatures” of API
call subsequences that are more likely to appear in adversarial
sequences, since they contain API calls (the adversarial-added
API calls) unrelated to their context.
We decided to analyze the statistical irregularities in n-
grams of consecutive API calls. The trade-off when choosing
n is to have a long enough n-gram to capture the irregularity
in the proper context (surrounding API calls), while remaining
short enough to allow generalization to other adversarial
examples.
For each unique API call (the features used in [41], [25]) n-
gram, we calculate the adversarial n-gram probability of the n-
gram of monitored API calls (w1, w2.., wn)|{w1, w2.., wn} ⊆
D, where D is the vocabulary of available features. Here those
features are all of the API calls recorded by the classifier.
padv(w1, w2.., wn) = (5)
| {x|x ∈ Xadv ∧ ((w1 ⊥ w2 ⊥ ..wn) ⊆ x)} |
| {x|x ∈ (Xadv ∪Xtrain,target) ∧ ((w1 ⊥ w2 ⊥ ..wn) ⊆ x)} |
⊥ is the concatenation operation. The adversarial n-gram
probability is the ratio of occurrences of the n-gram in the
adversarial example dataset available to the defender Xadv ,
as part of the occurrences in both the adversarial examples
and target (i.e., benign) class samples in the training set,
Xtrain,target.
Note that the equation is valid regardless of |Xadv|, and
there is no assumption regarding the ratio between |Xadv| and
|Xtrain,target|.
The reason we don’t include malicious samples is that we
want statistical irregularities from the target class, which is
the benign class in this case. Also note that we only look at
the appearance of the signatures in the target class and not in
other classes (i.e., we look only at the benign class and not
the malicious class). The reason for this is that it makes sense
that Xadv would contain API n-grams available in the source
class (the malicious class in this case), because in practice, it
is a source class sample.
We say that the n-gram of monitored API calls
(w1, w2.., wn) is an adversarial signature if the adversarial
n-gram probability of this n-gram is larger than a threshold
ThresholdPadv that is determined by the trade-off between
the adversarial example detection rate and the number of target
class samples falsely detected as adversarial; the higher the
threshold, the lower both would be.
We classify a sample as an adversarial example if it contains
more than ThresholdSigsadv adversarial signatures. The
more irregular n-grams detected, the more likely the sequence
is to be adversarial. Additional details are provided in Section
IV-C5.
This defense method requires a dataset of adversarial ex-
amples, Xadv , during its setup, in order to make it robust
against such examples, making it attack-specific, based on the
definition provided earlier in Section III.
Note that while finding “non-adversarial signatures” using
this method is possible, it is more problematic, especially when
|Xtrain,target| is very large. Other methods presented in this
paper, such as defense sequence GAN (see Section III-B2),
implement this approach more efficiently.
This defense method training overhead is high: counting all
subsequences of a certain size in the training set.
The inference overhead, however, is low: searching for the
adversarial signatures in the input sequence.
6) Adversarial Training: Adversarial training is the method
of adding adversarial examples, with their non perturbed label
(source class label), to the training set of the classifier. The
rationale for this is that since adversarial examples are usually
out-of-distribution samples, inserting them into the training
set would cause the classifier to learn the entire training set
distribution, including the adversarial examples.
Additional details are available in Section IV-C6.
Unlike all other methods mentioned in this paper, this
method has already been tried for sequence based input in
the NLP domain ([6], [33]), with mixed results about the
robustness it provides against adversarial attacks. Additional
issues regarding this method are described in Section II-B. We
evaluate this method in order to determine whether the cyber
security domain, with a much smaller dictionary (less than 400
API call types monitored in [41] compared to the millions of
possible words in NLP domains), would yield different results.
We also want to compare it to the defense methods presented
in this paper, using the same training set, classifier, etc.
This defense method training overhead is high (generating
many adversarial examples, following by training a classifier
on a training set containing them).
There is no inference overhead: the inference is simply
performed using the newly trained classifier.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
A. Dataset and Target Malware Classifiers
We use the same dataset used in [41], because of its size: it
contains 500,000 files (250,000 benign samples and 250,000
malware samples), faithfully representing the malware families
in the wild and allowing us a proper setting for attack and
defense method comparison. Details are provided in Appendix
A.
Each sample was run in Cuckoo Sandbox, a malware
analysis system, for two minutes per sample. Tracing only
the first few seconds of a program execution might not allow
the detection of certain malware types, like “logic bombs” that
commence their malicious behavior only after the program has
been running for some time. However, this can be mitigated
both by classifying the suspension mechanism as malicious,
if accurate, or by tracing the code operation throughout the
program execution lifetime, not just when the program starts.
The API call sequences generated by the inspected code during
its execution were extracted from the JSON file generated by
Cuckoo Sandbox. The extracted API call sequences were used
as the malware classifier’s features.
The samples were run on Windows 8.1 OS, since most
malware targets the Windows OS. Anti-sandbox malware was
filtered to prevent dataset contamination (see Appendix A).
After filtering, the final training set size is 360,000 samples,
36,000 of which serve as the validation set. The test set size is
36,000 samples. All sets were balanced between malicious and
benign samples, with the same malware families composition
as in the training set.
There are no commercial trial version or open-source API
call based deep learning intrusion detection systems available
(such commercial products target enterprises and involve su-
pervised server installation). Dynamic models are also not
available in free online malware scanning services like Virus-
Total. Therefore, we used RNN based malware classifiers,
trained on the API call traces generated by the abovementioned
dataset.
The API call sequences were split into windows of m API
calls each, and each window was classified in turn. Thus, the
input of all of the classifiers was a vector of m = 140 (larger
window sizes didn’t improve the classifier’s accuracy) API
call types, each with 314 possible values (those monitored by
Cuckoo Sandbox). The classifiers used to evaluate the attacks
are similar to those used in [41]. Their implementation and
hyperparameters (loss function, dropout, activation functions,
etc.), and the performance of the target classifiers are described
in Appendix B.
B. Evaluated Attacks
The attacks used to assess the defense methods’ robustness
are described in Appendix C. These are the state-of-the-art
out of the few published RNN attacks in the cyber security
domain. The attacks add API calls to the API trace (not re-
moving or modifying API calls, in order to avoid damaging the
modified code’s functionality) based on either their gradients,
maximizing the effect of each added API call, or randomly.
The maximum number of allowed adversarial API calls is 93
in each sliding window of n = 140 API calls (i.e., 66.67%
which is a very permissive boundary).
Three attacks are used to evaluate the robustness of our
defense methods:
1) A realistic gradient based black-box attack, in which
the attacker has no knowledge of the target classifier’s
architecture or weights and has to build a substitute
model, as done in [41]. The holdout dataset size to build
the substitute model was identical (70 samples) for a
fair comparison. The attack effectiveness for the LSTM
classifier (without any defense method) is 99.99%.
2) A white-box gradient based attack, where the adversary
uses the target classifier instead of a substitute model.
This attack is a stronger variant of the attack used in
[40], which has access only to the confidence score of
the classifier. The attack effectiveness for the LSTM
classifier (without any defense method) is 100.00%
3) An adaptive attacker white-box attack, where the at-
tacker is aware not only of the classifier’s architecture
and hyperparameters, but also of the defense method
being used. Thus, the attacker operates an adversarial
attack specially crafted for the used defense method.
These attacks are described per defense method in
Section IV-C. All of these attacks’ effectiveness for the
LSTM classifier is 100%.
4) A random perturbation attack. The attack effectiveness
for the LSTM classifier (without any defense method)
is 22.97% (average of five runs).
Adversarial attacks against images usually try to minimize the
number of modified pixels in order to evade human detection
of the perturbation. One might claim that such a definition of
minimal perturbation is irrelevant for API call traces: humans
cannot inspect sequences of thousands or millions of APIs,
so an attacker can add an unlimited amount of API calls,
this improving the attack effectiveness against the evaluated
defense methods.
However, one should bear in mind that malware aims to
perform its malicious functionality as quickly as possible. For
instance, ransomware usually starts by encrypting the most
critical files (e.g., the ’My Documents’ folder) first, so even if
the user turns off the computer and sends the hard drive to the
IT department - damage has already been done. The same is
true for a keylogger that aims to send the user passwords to the
attacker as soon as possible, so they can be used immediately,
before the malware has been detected and neutralized.
Moreover, adding too many API calls would cause the
program’s profile to become anomalous, making it easier to
detect by anomaly detection intrusion detection systems, e.g.,
those that measure CPU usage [36], or contain irregular API
call subsequences (Section III-B5).
Finally, the robustness of the defense methods to the ad-
dition of many API calls is being evaluated by the random
perturbation attack. The random attack adds 50% API calls to
the trace, as opposed to 0.0005% API calls for the entire trace
for the gradient based black-box and white-box attacks [41].
or 10,000 times more API calls, buy has much lower evasion
rate. Thus, samples whose adversarial variants are detected
cannot evade detection simply by adding more perturbations.
C. Defense Methods Implementation Details
Additional details about the implementation of the defense
methods are provided in the subsections that follow. Each
subsection also contains a description of the best adaptive
white-box attack against this method, that is, if the attacker
knows this method is being used, how can he/she bypass it
most effectively.
1) Sequence Squeezing: We used Stanford’s GloVe imple-
mentation [3] with embedding dimensionality of d = 32. The
vocabulary D used by our malware classifiers contains all of
the API calls monitored by Cuckoo Sandbox, documented in
the Cuckoo Sandbox repository [1].
Running Algorithm 1 on our training set (see Section IV-A)
of API call traces resulted in interesting sequence squeezing. It
seems that the squeezed groups maintained the “API contextual
semantics” as expected, merging, for instance, the variants of
the same API, e.g., GetUserNameA() and GetUserNameW().
Other merged API calls are different API calls with the same
functionality, e.g., socket() and WSASocketA().
The sequence squeezing we used, with sizeDsqueezed =⌈
|D|
2
⌉
= 157, is described in Appendix D. Using smaller
feature spaces, e.g., sizeDsqueezed =
⌈
|D|
3
⌉
, resulted in
the inability to maintain the “API contextual semantics,”
merging unrelated API calls and reducing the classifier’s
accuracy by 7%. However, using larder feature spaces, e.g.,
sizeDsqueezed =
⌈
2|D|
3
⌉
,did not limit the adversarial space
enough, resulting in 5% adversarial recall loss. For our training
set, we used Thresholdadv = 0.18.
Other hyperparameters (grid-search selected) were less ef-
fective.
a) Best Adaptive White-Box Attack: To bypass sequence
squeezing defense method, the attacker performs the white-box
attack (described in Section IV-B) twice: once on the original
input sequence (generating the adversarial example x∗) and
once on the squeezed sequence (generating the adversarial
example x∗squeezed), both of them using perturbation only
from the squeezed vocabulary Dsqueezed, and not from D.
This is done iteratively, until we bypass the threshold being
set in Equation 3: Thresholdadv ≥ (|f(x∗)−f(x∗squeezed)|).
If this attack doesn’t succeed after 10 iterations, the attack has
failed.
2) Defense Sequence-GAN: To implement the benign per-
turbation GAN, we tested several GAN types, using Texygen
[53] with its default parameters. We used MLE training as the
pretraining process for all of the GAN types except GSGAN,
which requires no pretraining. In pretraining, we first trained
80 epochs for a generator and then trained 80 epochs for
a discriminator. The adversarial training came next. In each
adversarial epoch, we updated the generator once and then
updated the discriminator for 15 mini-batch gradients. We
generated a window of 140 API calls, each with 314 possible
API call types, in each iteration.
As mentioned in Section III-B2, we tested several GAN
implementations with discrete sequence output: SeqGAN [50],
TextGAN [51], GSGAN [30], and MaliGAN [13]. We trained
our “benign GAN” using a benign holdout set (3,000 se-
quences). Next, we generated m = 200 sequences with the
“benign GAN,” using an additional benign hold-out set (3,000
sequences) as a test set. We used the same procedure to train
our “malicious GAN” and generated an additional m = 200
sequences using it.
SeqGAN outperforms all other models by providing the
average minimal distance (both the Euclidean distance and
cosine distance provided similar results) between the 400
sequences generated and the test set vectors, meaning that
the sequences generated were the closest to the requested
distribution, thus, we used SeqGAN.
a) Best Adaptive White-Box Attack: To bypass defense
sequence GAN, the attacker performs the white-box attack
(described in Section IV-B) and then performs the same pro-
cess done by the defender in Section III-B2: He/she generates
m = 200 sequences with the “benign GAN,” and generates
an additional m = 200 sequences using the “malicious
GAN”. The attacker iteratively repeats this process until the
adversarial sequence is closer to one of the benign GAN
sequences which are classified as benign. If this attack doesn’t
succeed after 10 iterations, the attack has failed.
3) Nearest Neighbor: The cosine distance is more effective
than the Euclidean distance in many NLP tasks. However, the
differences in performance due to the use of cosine distance
instead of Euclidean distance were marginal, as mentioned in
Section III-B3. Therefore, we used the Euclidean distance for
nearest neighbor calculations.
a) Best Adaptive White-Box Attack: To bypass the near-
est neighbor defense method, the attacker iteratively performs
the white-box attack (described in Section IV-B) and then
calculates the distance to the nearest neighbor in the training
set, until this neighbor’s classification is benign. If this attack
doesn’t succeed after 10 iterations, the attack has failed.
4) RNN Ensemble: We used six variants of ensembles, each
consisting of nine models:
• Regular ensemble - Each model was trained on the entire
dataset.
• Subsequence ensemble - The first model is trained on API
calls at offsets between 1..140 in the API call trace, the
second model is trained on API calls at offsets 11...150
in the API call trace, etc. The ninth model is trained on
API calls at offsets 91..230 in the API call trace.
• Bagging ensemble - Each model is trained on a random
subset of the dataset, as discussed in Section III-B4.
• Bagging subsequence ensemble - This is a combination
of the bagging and subsequence ensembles. Each model
is trained not only on a different API call offset range
(like the regular subsequence ensemble described above)
but also on a random subset of the training set, as in the
bagging ensemble.
• Adversarial ensemble - Each model has 14,000 (out of
27,000) malicious samples replaced with their adversarial
example variants, similar to adversarial training (see
Section IV-C6).
• Adversarial subsequence ensemble - This is a combina-
tion of the adversarial and subsequence ensembles. The
adversarial examples’ API call traces used for training
also start at an offset.
The output of the ensemble presented in Table II was made
using soft voting (see Section III-B4). However, the difference
between soft and hard voting in all of our tests was marginal.
a) Best Adaptive White-Box Attack: To bypass RNN
ensemble defense method, the attacker performs the white-
box attack (described in Section IV-B) on each classifier in
the ensemble in turn, and aggregates the added adversarial API
calls from all the attacks into the same adversarial sequence.
5) Adversarial Signatures: We chose n = 5, i.e., we
used 5-grams of API calls for the “adversarial signatures.”
Shorter API call subsequences caused more “adversarial false
positives,” i.e., identifying regular samples as adversarial (e.g.,
n = 4 resulted in 0.5% of the test set incorrectly classified
as adversarial), while longer API call sequences were too
specific to detect the majority of the adversarial examples (e.g.,
n = 6, while having optimal performance in other systems
[46], resulted in a 15% loss of adversarial recall).
We used ThresholdPadv = 1.0, thus, we looked for API
subsequences which appear only in adversarial examples. We
also used ThresholdSigsadv = 1, so that in order to classify a
sample as an adversarial example, it is enough that it contains
a single adversarial signature.
Other hyperparameters (grid search selected) were less
effective.
a) Best Adaptive White-Box Attack: To bypass adver-
sarial signatures, the attacker performs the white-box attack
(described in Section IV-B), but verifies for each added ad-
versarial API call that its addition generates no adversarial
signatures. If it does, the attacker would choose a different
position in the sequence instead to add a different adversarial
API call, by re-calculating the gradients, as described in
Appendix C.
6) Adversarial Training: We ran the adversarial black-box
and white-box attacks (see Appendix C), as suggested in [34],
on the training set. We generated 14,000 malicious adversarial
examples (50% generated by the black-box attack and 50%
by the white-box attack), which replaced 14,000 malicious
samples in the original training set. Other sizes (grid search
selected) resulted in reduced accuracy.
a) Best Adaptive White-Box Attack: To bypass adver-
sarial training, the attacker performs the white-box attack
(described in Section IV-B) on the classifier trained on the
augmented training set that includes the adversarial examples,
either.
D. Defense Method Performance
The different defense methods mentioned in Section III are
measured using two factors:
The adversarial recall is the fraction of adversarial se-
quences generated by the attack which were either detected by
the defense method or classified as malicious by the classifier.
Adversarial recall provides a metric for the robustness of the
classifier combined with a defense method against a specific
adversarial attack.
The classifiers’ accuracy, which applies equal weight to
both false positives and false negatives (unlike precision or
recall), thereby providing an unbiased overall performance
indicator. The accuracy is evaluated against the regular test
set only (that is, without adversarial examples). Using this
method, we verify the effect our defense methods have on
the classifiers’ performance for non-adversarial samples. Since
samples classified as adversarial examples are automatically
classified as malicious (because there is no reason for a benign
adversarial example), every benign sample classified as an
adversarial example would damage the classifier’s accuracy.
Therefore, we also specify the false positive rate of the
classifier to better asses the effect of those cases.
The performance of the attack versus the various defense
methods and the classifier’s performance using those defense
methods for the LSTM classifier (see Appendix B; note that
the other tested classifiers mentioned in Appendix B behave
the same) are presented in Table II. All adaptive white-box
attacks were tried against all defense methods, but only the
best one (with the lowest adversarial recall) is shown in the
table, due-to space limits.
The overhead column contains high-level observations re-
garding the defense method’s overhead (none, low, or high),
both during training (time and money) and during inference
(run-time performance). The analysis is described in detail in
the subsections of Section III. As models get more complicated
and larger in size, we would expect defense methods with
lower overhead to be more easily deployed in real-world
scenarios.
We see that certain defense methods, such as RNN sub-
sequence ensembles and adversarial signatures, provide good
robustness against adversarial attacks (75-85% adversarial
recall). Ensemble models also improve the classifier per-
formance on non-adversarial samples. However, our novel
defense method, sequence squeezing, provides a much lower
overhead than all the other methods, while still offering good
robustness against adversarial attacks, making it the most
suited for real world scenarios and especially when real time
classification is required, like in the cyber security domain.
Sequence squeezing is also the best method against an adaptive
attacker, leaving the defender better off than with any other
evaluated defense method.
E. Discussion
Table II reveals several interesting issues:
We see that the best defense method selection depends on
the specific scenario:
• When the training and inference overhead is not a
concern, an RNN subsequence ensemble provide good
robustness against adversarial attacks (especially white-
box attacks, both adaptive and not) while improving the
classifier performance on non-adversarial samples.
• When an attack-specific defense is acceptable, adversarial
signatures provide good robustness against adversarial at-
tacks (especially black-box attacks), with lower overhead.
• Finally, for cases where a low overhead attack-agnostic
defense method is required (as required in most real
world scenarios), the novel sequence squeezing defense
method provides good robustness against adversarial at-
tacks, with much lower overhead, at a price of a slight
degradation in the classifier performance against non-
adversarial samples (0.1% addition to the false positive
rate). This means that sequence squeezing is the best
choice for cyber security applications, where on the one
hand, adversaries need to be identified in real time, but on
the other hand, the adversarial attack method is unknown,
so attack-specific method like adversarial signatures is
irrelevant.
Attack-specific defense methods (adversarial signatures, ad-
versarial training) present very poor adversarial recall against
the best adaptive white-box attack. Attack-agnostic defense
methods which rely on the assumption that the attacker would
use minimal perturbation (defense sequence GAN, nearest
neighbor) provide slightly better performance, but still cannot
cope with attackers that use larger perturbations. Our novel
defense method, sequence squeezing, is the best one against
adaptive attacks. The reason is sequence squeezing reduces
the dimensionality of the possible adversarial perturbations,
limiting the attacker’s possibilities to perturb the input and
evade detection,
TABLE II
DEFENSE METHOD PERFORMANCE
Defense Method Adversarial
Recall [%],
Best
Adaptive
White-Box
Attack
Adversarial
Recall [%],
White-Box
Attack
Adversarial
Recall [%],
Black-Box
Attack
Adversarial Recall
[%], Random
Perturbation
Attack (Average
of 5 Runs)
Classifier
Accuracy/False
Positive Rate [%],
Non-Perturbed
Test Set
Method Overhead
(Training/
Inference)
Original Classifier (No Defense
Methods)
- - - - 91.81/0.89 None/None
Sequence Squeezing 38.76 86.96 48.57 99.14 90.81/0.99 Low/Low
Defense Sequence-GAN 13.18 50.49 57.38 97.35 64.55/3.85 High/High
Nearest Neighbor 11.68 88.78 56.12 40.56 87.85/1.32 None/High
RNN Ensemble (Regular) 19.65 47.91 73.0 84.54 92.59/0.81 High/High
RNN Ensemble (Subsequence) 22.72 86.27 56.79 85.55 92.27/0.84 High/High
RNN Ensemble (Bagging) 18.23 47.90 73.01 87.29 92.65/0.80 High/High
RNN Ensemble (Bagging
Subsequence)
24.15 86.26 56.78 79.00 90.54/1.03 High/High
RNN Ensemble (Adversarial) 21.17 47.92 73.02 99.57 92.97/0.76 High/High
RNN Ensemble (Adversarial
Subsequence)
27.19 86.27 56.79 99.34 92.21/0.85 High/High
Adversarial Signatures 11.65 75.36 75.38 99.78 91.81/0.89 High/Low
Adversarial Training 11.16 48.32 12.39 99.09 91.81/0.91 High/None
The evaluated defense methods usually provide greater
robustness against white-box attacks than against black-box
attacks. This suggests that transferable adversarial examples,
the ones that bypass the substitute model and are also ef-
fective against another classifier (the target model), as done
in the black-box attack, are different from other adversarial
examples (e.g., drawn from a different distribution), causing
defense methods to be less effective against them. For instance,
transferable adversarial examples might contain adversarial
API calls with similar semantic meaning to the API calls of
the original benign sample, making sequence squeezing less
effective. Analyzing the differences between black-box and
white-box RNN adversarial examples and their effect on our
proposed defense methods will be addressed in future work.
All of the evaluated defense methods provide adequate
robustness against a random perturbation attack. However, as
shown earlier in Section IV-D, this attack is less effective than
other attack types and is ineffective even when no defense
method is applied.
The accuracy of the RNN ensembles is higher than the
original classifier for all ensemble types. The RNN subse-
quence ensembles also provide good robustness against white-
box attacks, while the non-subsequence ensembles provide
good robustness against black-box attacks. Bagging and ad-
versarial models do not affect the performance when adding
them to the subsequence or regular models.
On the other hand, an ensemble requires the training of many
models. This affects both the training time and the prediction
time: An ensemble of nine models like in this study, requires
nine times the training and inference time of a single model.
One might claim that the improvement of RNN subsequence
ensemble classifiers on non-adversarial samples results from
the fact that those classifiers consider more API calls in each
sliding window (230 API calls in all nine models, instead of
140 API calls in a single model). However, testing larger API
call sliding windows for a single classifier (1000 API calls
in [41]) did not result in a similar improvement. This leads
us to believe that the improved performance actually derives
from the ensemble itself and not from the input size. This is
supported by the improvement in non-subsequence ensembles.
The sequence squeezing defense method provides good
robustness against white-box attacks but is less effective
against black-box attacks. This defense method causes a small
decrease in the classifier performance (about 1%) and doubles
the prediction time, because two models are being run: the
original and the sequence squeezed models.
The adversarial signatures defense method provides the
best black-box attack robustness, but its white-box attack
performance is lower than sequence squeezing.
The only published defense method to date, adversarial
training, underperforms in comparison to all other defense
methods evaluated, since its adversarial recall is lower.
For the defense sequence GAN method, the inability of the
sequence based GANs to capture the complex input sequence
distribution (demonstrated, for instance, by the fact that some
of the API sequences generated by the GAN contain only
a single API call type, as opposed to the training set benign
samples), causes its classifier accuracy against non-adversarial
samples to be the lowest of all other defense methods and the
original classifier, making defense sequence GAN unusable in
real-world scenarios.
Given the low accuracy of the classifier on non-adversarial
samples when using the defense sequence GAN method, as
opposed to the good performance of Defense-GAN in the im-
age recognition domain [42], we hypothesize that the problem
is due to the fact that the sequence based GANs we used
(like SeqGAN) were unable to capture the true distribution of
the input sequence and produced bad seqence GAN output.
This was validated by analyzing the nearest neighbor defense
method’s performance.
We see that for the nearest neighbor defense method, both
the classifier accuracy for non-adversarial test set and the
adversarial recall are higher. This suggests that a larger se-
quence GAN training set (which would require a stronger
machine with more GPU memory than that used in this
research) would result in a better approximation of the input
sequence distribution by the sequence GAN and thus allow
defense sequence GAN to be as effective as the nearest
neighbor defense method - and more generalizable to samples
significantly different from the training set. Such experiments
are planned for future work.
The nearest neighbor method also has its limitations: its
adversarial recall against random perturbations is low, since
this attack method adds, on average, more than 50% new,
random API calls. In this case, the nearest neighbor is more
likely to be a benign sample, causing an adversarial example
to be missed.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we present a novel defense method against
RNN adversarial examples and compare it to a baseline of
four defense methods inspired by state-of-the-art CNN defense
methods. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper
to focus on this challenge, which is different from developing
defense methods to use against non-sequence based adversarial
examples.
We found that sequence squeezing, our novel defense
method, is the only method which provides the balance be-
tween the low overhead required by real time classifiers (like
malware classifiers) and good robustness against adversarial
attacks. This makes sequence squeezing the most suited for
real world scenarios, and especially for API call based RNN
classifiers that need to provide classification in real time, while
new classifier input (API calls) is constantly being fed.
Our future work will focus on four directions:
1) Investigating additional defense methods (e.g., using
cluster centroid distance instead of nearest neighbors
to improve run-time performance) and evaluating the
performance obtained when several defense methods are
combined.
2) Extending our work to other domains that use input
sequences, such as NLP.
3) Observing the performance gap of our defense methods
against black-box and white-box attacks (as discussed in
Section IV-D) illustrates some interesting questions. For
example, we would evaluate the effect of implementing
defense methods using white-box adversarial examples,
as opposed to black-box examples, which were used in
this paper.
The increasing usage of machine learning based classifiers,
such as “next generation anti virus,” raises concern from actual
adversaries (the malware developers) trying to evade such
systems using adversarial learning. Making such malware clas-
sifiers robust against adversarial attack is therefore important,
and this paper (as well as future research in this domain)
provides methods to defend classifiers that use RNNs, such as
dynamic analysis API call sequence based malware classifiers,
from adversarial attacks.
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APPENDIX A: TESTED DATASET
We used identical implementation details (e.g., dataset,
classifier hyperparameters, etc.) as [41], so the attacks can
be compared. Those details are provided here for the reader’s
convenience.
An overview of the malware classification process is shown
in Figure 3, as presented in [41].
The dataset used is large and includes the latest malware
variants, such as the Cerber and Locky ransomware fam-
ilies. Each malware type (ransomware, worms, backdoors,
droppers, spyware, PUAs, and viruses) has the same number
of samples, in order to prevent prediction bias towards the
majority class. 20% of the malware families (such as the
NotPetya ransomware family) were only used in the test set
to assess generalization to an unseen malware family. 80% of
the malware families (such as the Virut virus family) were
distributed between the training and test sets to determine
the classifier’s ability to generalize to samples from the same
family. The temporal difference between the training set and
the test set is six months (i.e., all training set samples are older
than the test set samples), based on VirusTotal’s ’first seen’
date.
The ground truth labels of the dataset were determined by
VirusTotal, an online malware scanning service which contains
more than 60 different security products. A sample with 15
or more positive classifications (i.e., is considered malicious)
from the 60 products is considered malicious by our classifiers.
A sample with zero positive classifications is labeled as be-
nign. All samples with 1-14 positives were omitted to prevent
false positive contamination of the dataset. Family labels for
dataset balancing were taken from the Kaspersky Anti-Virus
classifications.
It is crucial to prevent dataset contamination by malware
that detects whether the malware is running in a Cuckoo
Sandbox (or on virtual machines) and if so, quits immediately
to prevent reverse engineering efforts. In those cases, the
sample’s label is malicious, but its behavior recorded in
Cuckoo Sandbox (its API call sequence) isn’t, due to its anti-
forensic capabilities. To mitigate such contamination of the
dataset, two countermeasures were used:
1) Considering only API call sequences with more than 15
API calls (as in [26]) and omitting malware that detects
a virtual machine (VM) and quits.
2) Applying YARA rules to find samples trying to detect
sandbox programs, such as Cuckoo Sandbox, and omit-
ting all such samples.
One might argue that the evasive malware that applies such
anti-VM techniques are extremely challenging and relevant,
however in this paper, we focus on the adversarial attack. This
attack is generic enough to work for those evasive malware
as well, assuming that other mitigation techniques (e.g., anti-
anti-VM), would be applied.
After this filtering and balancing of the benign samples,
about 400,000 valid samples remained. The final training
set size is 360,000 samples, 36,000 of which serve as the
Fig. 3. Overview of the Malware Classification Process
validation set. The test set size is 36,000 samples. All sets
are balanced between malicious and benign samples. Due to
hardware limitations, a subset of the dataset was used as a
training set: 54,000 training samples and test and validation
sets of 6,000 samples each. The dataset was representative and
maintained the same distribution as the entire dataset described
above.
APPENDIX B: MALWARE CLASSIFIERS TESTED
As mentioned in Section IV, we used the malware classifiers
from [41], since many classifiers are covered, allowing us
to evaluate the defense performance against many types of
classifiers. The maximum input sequence length was limited
to m = 140 API calls, since longer sequence lengths, e.g.,
m = 1000, had no effect on the accuracy, and padded shorter
sequences with zeros. A zero stands for a null/dummy value
API in our one-hot encoding. Longer sequences are split into
windows of m API calls each, and each window is classified
in turn. If any window is malicious, the entire sequence is
considered malicious. Thus, the input of all of the classifiers
is a vector of m = 140 API call types in one-hot encoding,
using 314 bits, since there were 314 monitored API call types
in the Cuckoo reports for the dataset. The output is a binary
classification: malicious or benign.
An overview of the LSTM architecture is shown in Figure
4.
The Keras implementation was used for all neural network
classifiers, with TensorFlow used for the backend.
The loss function used for training was binary cross-entropy.
The Adam optimizer was used for all of the neural networks.
The output layer was fully connected with sigmoid activation
for all neural networks. For neural networks, a rectified linear
unit, ReLU(x) = max(0, x), was chosen as an activation
function for the input and hidden layers due to its fast con-
vergence compared to sigmoid() or tanh(), and dropout was
used to improve the generalization potential of the network.
A batch size of 32 samples was used.
The classifiers also have the following classifier-specific
hyperparameters:
• RNN, LSTM, GRU, BRNN, BLSTM, bidirectional GRU
- a hidden layer of 128 units, with a dropout rate of 0.2
for both inputs and recurrent states.
• Deep LSTM and BLSTM - two hidden layers of 128
units, with a dropout rate of 0.2 for both inputs and
recurrent states in both layers.
Classifier performance was measured using the accuracy ratio,
which gives equal importance to both false positives and false
negatives (unlike precision or recall). The false positive rate
of the classifiers varied between 0.5-1%.
The performance of the classifiers is shown in Table III.
The accuracy was measured on the test set, which contains
36,000 samples.
Fig. 4. LSTM Classifier Architecture
TABLE III
CLASSIFIER PERFORMANCE
Classifier Type Accuracy (%)
RNN 97.90
BRNN 95.58
LSTM 98.26
Deep LSTM 97.90
BLSTM 97.90
Deep BLSTM 98.02
GRU 97.32
Bidirectional GRU 98.04
As can be seen in Table III, the LSTM variants are the best
malware classifiers, in terms of accuracy.
APPENDIX C: ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS USED
We used the adversarial attack implemented in [41], since
this is the state-of-the-art adversarial attack in the cyber secu-
rity domain. An adversarial example is a sequence of API calls
classified as malicious by the classifier, which is perturbed by
the addition of API calls, so that the modified sequence will
be misclassified as benign. In order to prevent damaging the
code’s functionality, one cannot remove or modify API calls;
one can only add additional API calls. The attack used to
evaluate the robustness of our defense method is described in
Algorithm 2.
1 Input: f (black-box model), fˆ (substitute model), x
(malicious sequence to perturb, of length l), n (size of
adversarial sliding window), D (vocabulary)
2 for each sliding window wj of n API calls in x:
3 wj
∗ = wj
4 while f(w∗j ) = malicious and the number of
modifications in wj∗ <
⌈
2n
3
⌉
:
5 Randomly select an API’s position i in w
6 # Insert a new adversarial API in position
i ∈ {1..n}:
7 w∗j [i] = argminapi ||sign(wj∗ −w∗j [1 : i− 1] ⊥
api ⊥ w∗j [i : n− 1])− sign(Jfˆ (wj)[f(wj)])||
8 Replace wj (in x) with wj∗
9 return (perturbed) x
Algorithm 2: Adversarial Sequence Generation
D is the vocabulary of available features, that is, the API
calls recorded by the classifier. The adversarial API call
sequence length of l might be different than n, which is the
length of the sliding window API call sequence that is used
by the adversary. Therefore, like the prediction, the attack
is performed sequentially on
⌈
l
n
⌉
windows of n API calls.
We chose n = m = 140 (the window size of the classifier,
mentioned in Appendix B). ⊥ is the concatenation operation.
w∗j [1 : i − 1] ⊥ api ⊥ w∗j [i : n − 1] is the insertion of
the encoded API vector in position i of w∗j . In each window
wj , the adversary randomly chooses i since he/she does not
have any way to better select i without incurring significant
statistical overhead.
Note that an insertion of an API in position i means that
the APIs from position i..n (w∗j [i : n] ) are “pushed back”
one position to make room for the new API call, in order
to maintain the original sequence and preserve the original
functionality of the code. Since the sliding window has a fixed
length, the last API call, w∗j [n], is “pushed out” and removed
from w∗j (this is why the term is ⊥ w∗j [i : n− 1], as opposed
to ⊥ w∗j [i : n]). The APIs “pushed out” from wj will become
the beginning of wj+1, so no API is ignored.
The newly added API call is w∗j [i] =
argminapi ||sign(wj∗ − w∗j [0 : i] ⊥ api ⊥ w∗j [i :
n − 1]) − sign(Jfˆ (wj)[f(wj)])||. sign(Jfˆ (wj)[f(wj)])
gives us the direction in which we have to perturb the API
call sequence in order to reduce the probability assigned
to the malicious class, f(x), and thus change the predicted
label of the API call sequence. However, the set of legitimate
API call embeddings is finite. Thus, we cannot set the new
API to any real value. We therefore find the API call api
in D whose insertion directs us closest to the direction
indicated by the Jacobian as most impactful on the model’s
prediction. We iteratively apply this heuristic until either the
classification of the entire sequence changes (meaning that
the classification of each window wj changes) or until the
maximum number of modifications is reached in a certain
window:
⌈
2n
3
⌉
. In the latter case, the attack has failed.
The use of a maximum number of allowed perturbations is
commonly used in adversarial learning, and a modification
of 66.67% of the malware API calls (up to 93 adversarial
API calls in each window of n = 140 API calls) is a very
permissive boundary.
Three variants of this attack were used. In the white-box
variant, we used fˆ(x) = f(x), so the attacker is fully aware
of the architecture, weights, and hyperparameters of the target
classifier. In the black-box variant, we used a substitute model,
as used in [41]. The substitute model was a GRU with 64
units (different from the malware classifiers used in Appendix
B). Besides the classifier’s type and architecture, a different
optimizer was used for the substitute model (ADADELTA
instead of Adam). Finally, in the random perturbation variant,
no substitute model was used, and line 7 was replaced with a
randomly chosen API call type.
APPENDIX D: SEQUENCE SQUEEZING FOR API CALLS
MONITORED BY CUCKOO SANDBOX
TABLE IV
SEQUENCE SQUEEZING FOR CUCKOO SANDBOX MONITORED API CALLS
CertControlStore CertControlStore
CertCreateCertificateContext CertCreateCertificateContext
CertOpenStore CertOpenStore
CertOpenSystemStoreA CertOpenStore
CertOpenSystemStoreW CertOpenStore
CoCreateInstance CoCreateInstance
CoCreateInstanceEx CoCreateInstance
CoGetClassObject CoGetClassObject
CoInitializeEx CoInitialize
CoInitializeSecurity CoInitialize
CoUninitialize CoUninitialize
ControlService ControlService
CopyFileA CopyFile
CopyFileExW CopyFile
CopyFileW CopyFile
CreateActCtxW CreateActCtxW
CreateDirectoryExW CreateDirectory
CreateDirectoryW CreateDirectory
CreateProcessInternalW CreateProcess
CreateRemoteThread NtCreateThreadEx
CreateRemoteThreadEx NtCreateThreadEx
CreateServiceA CreateService
CreateServiceW CreateService
CreateThread NtCreateThreadEx
CreateToolhelp32Snapshot CreateToolhelp32Snapshot
CryptAcquireContextA CryptAcquireContext
CryptAcquireContextW CryptAcquireContext
CryptCreateHash CryptCreateHash
CryptDecodeMessage CryptDecrypt
CryptDecodeObjectEx CryptDecrypt
CryptDecrypt CryptDecrypt
CryptEncrypt CryptEncrypt
CryptExportKey CryptKey
CryptGenKey CryptKey
CryptHashData CryptHash
CryptHashMessage CryptHash
CryptProtectData CryptEncrypt
CryptProtectMemory CryptEncrypt
CryptUnprotectData CryptDecrypt
CryptUnprotectMemory CryptDecrypt
DecryptMessage CryptDecrypt
DeleteFileW DeleteFile
DeleteService DeleteService
DeleteUrlCacheEntryA DeleteUrlCacheEntry
DeleteUrlCacheEntryW DeleteUrlCacheEntry
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